In this paper, we investigate how visible minority and immigrant earnings gaps in Canada evolved over 1991 to 2006. Immigrant disparity changes with the duration of residence in Canada, so we evaluate disparity at 5 years in Canada, that is for relatively recent immigrants. We find that, overall, visible minority-and immigrant-based earnings disparity increased substantially over the 15 year period. This pattern is observed broadly for both men and women, in Canada as a whole and in each of its three largest CMAs, for most white and visible minority immigrant groups, and for most Canadian-born visible minority ethnic groups. The decline in relative earnings is large: it is on the order of 20 percentage points for both white and visible minority immigrants and on the order of 10 percentage points for Canadian-born visible minority workers.
Introduction
A large body of Canadian research shows that immigrants can face substantial labour market disparity, which may be worsening since 1990 (see for example, Akbari, 1992; Howland and Sakellariou, 1993; Stelcner and Kyriazis, 1995; Christofides and Swidinsky, 1994; Baker and Benjamin, 1995; Hum and Simpson, 1999; Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; Lian and Matthews, 1998) . A smaller literature has established that Canadian-born visible minorities also face labour market disparity (see Stelcner, 2000; Pendakur and Pendakur 1998 , 2002 , 2011 . These papers have shown that both male and female visible minorities face disadvantage, and that certain visible minority ethnic groups drive this disparity, especially those of South-Asian and Black/Caribbean/African origins (see de Silva and Dougherty 1996; Baker and Benjamin 1995; Hum and Simpson 1999; Pendakur and Pendakur 2002) . Further, Skuterud (2010) finds that earnings gaps can remain even after three generations. Similarly, Palameta (2007) and Pendakur and Pendakur 2011) find that gaps do not disappear for Canadian-born visible minorities. Conversely, Reitz, Zhang and Hawkins (2009) find that some Canadian-born racial minorities, particularly men of Chinese origin, perform better than white workers.
We investigate how minority and immigrant earnings gaps in Canada have evolved from 1991 to 2006. We use four micro data sets containing all the "long form" records collected by Statistics Canada for the 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 Censuses of Canada. These data sets are very large and allow consistent definitions of variables over the period. It is thus possible to assess the degree to which non-Aboriginal Canadian-born and immigrant minorities face earnings differentials, as well as the degree to which those differentials have changed over time. In this way, we are able to assess how the findings of previous research--which examine a variety of time periods and use different methods--compare to a method that uses consistent data and methodology over time.
18% less than non-minority males on average. Using 1991 Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) data, Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) found the earnings gap to be 2% for immigrant white men, and 16% for immigrant visible minority men. Lian and Mathews (1998) similarly used the 1991 Census PUMF to conclude that immigrants of Western European ethnic backgrounds actually displayed higher incomes than the average for Canadian-born workers; however, this advantage was not observed for workers of Eastern and Southern European backgrounds, and statistically significant disadvantage was observed for visible minorities ranging from 5% for those of Arab ethnicity, to 33% for those of Filipino background (Lian and Mathews, 1998) .
Such earning differentials were confirmed in the later 1990s by Hum and Simpson (1999) , who, using data from the 1993 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, found entry earnings for visible minority immigrant men to be 37% lower than Canadian-born males compared to 9% for immigrant males from Europe. Using the Longitudinal Immigrant Data Base (IMDB) to examine immigrant entry earnings and catch-up rates between 1980 , Li (2003 found that immigrants who arrived in the 1990s did indeed have lower entry earnings than those who arrived in the 1980s. However, his findings indicate that those who arrived more recently took less time to catch up with the average earnings of native-born Canadians. Similarly, Hum and Simpson (1999) estimated that the earnings of immigrant men had the potential to converge within ten years, with the time increasing to thirty years for immigrant women. However, both studies continued to recognize that such optimism was unlikely to be extended to immigrants from non-European countries. Li (2003) found that immigrants from Asia and Africa took longer to catch up, and Hum and Simpson (1999) estimated that convergence was unlikely to occur within the lifetime of visible minorities.
Entering the 2000s, a longitudinal study by Galarneau and Morissette (2004) compared Census data from 1991, 1996, and 2001 to reaffirm that no narrowing of the earnings gap had occurred for the immigrant population at large. Where the earnings of recent immigrants were found to be 20% lower than Canadian-born workers in 1991, the same gap was observed in 2001. As concluded in a literature review conducted by Hum and Simpson (2004) , evidence from crosssections and panel data of studies has contributed to a common acceptance of the notion that immigrant earnings are unlikely to converge with those of native-born Canadians. Kogan (2006) , using the European Labour Force Survey data from 1992 to 2000 revealed that "third-country" immigrants (those from outside the European Union) also experienced greater labour market integration in countries with a higher demand for low-skilled labour, including the UK and Southern Europe. Differences in immigrants' countries of origin revealed that those from Sub-Saharan African countries experienced a substantial disadvantage compared to those from Asian countries (Kogan, 2006) . Conversely, a US study by Hall and Farkas (2008) applied a random coefficient regression model to the Survey of Income and Program Participation data from 1996 to1999, and 2001 to 2003, to find that many US immigrants are employed in similar occupations to native-born Americans, and experience substantial wage gains over time. However, similarly to Galarneau and Morissette (2004) , immigrants are found to earn 24% less than native-born workers, with Latino immigrants suffering from barriers to mobility (moving from one job to another) and more severe wage discrimination (Hall and Farkas, 2008) .
Specifically, we estimate earnings differentials between white and visible minority workers for Canada as a whole and in three large Canadian cities across four census years. In addition, we investigate earnings differentials between British-origin workers and 34 ethnic groups (both white and nonwhite) in Canada as a whole, and in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver separately. We choose these groups for two reasons. They are large enough to provide statistically significant results at the Canada-wide level over the 15-year period, but not necessarily at the CMA level. Further, this categorization is also compatible with Pendakur and Pendakur 2010, but includes immigrant groups.
Our sample is restricted to workers earning more than $100 per year, whose major source of income is wages and salaries, who are aged between 25 and 65, and who are not temporary residents of Canada and who are not Aboriginal persons. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual earnings from wages and salaries in the previous year.
1
We estimate log-earnings equations controlling only for ethnic origin, personal characteristics, and immigrant characteristics. Ethnic origin, as noted above, is either visible minority status, or a more detailed list of 34 ethnic origins. Personal characteristics are: age, education, marital status, official language knowledge, and census metropolitan area of residence.
For immigrant workers, we add additional variables: immigrant status, the number of years since migration, and both of these variables interacted with visible minority status. In regressions using the more detailed list of ethnic origins, we interact immigrant status with the ethnic origin, rather than with visible minority status, and interact years since migration with visible minority status. We include regressors to control for the amount of time an immigrant has resided in Canada. These controls have a value of 0 for an immigrant whose year of arrival in Canada is 5 years before the income year reported in that Census. Thus, the coefficient on the immigrant variable may be interpreted as the log-earnings disparity faced by an immigrant who has been in Canada for 5 years. For example, if the immigrant dummy has a value of -0.05, this means that a 1
Coefficients from log-earnings can be interpreted as approximately equal to percentage disparities between the group of interest and the specified reference (i.e. "left-out") category, holding constant all the personal characteristics in the regression. In our regressions, the left-out category is "white" when considering visible minorities as a whole, and is "British" when considering the collection of 34 ethnic groupings. Thus, if a reported coefficient on visible minority is -0.05, then one could say that visible minorities earn 5% less than whites with similar personal characteristics.
white immigrant who arrived in 1985 faces earnings disparity of about 5 per cent in 1990 (reported in the 1991 Census).
2
In controlling only for the personal characteristics of workers, we intentionally leave out the characteristics of the jobs those workers have. We believe that the work characteristics of workers -such as occupation and industry sector -are at least as susceptible to ethnic discrimination as the wages paid to workers. The case is made by Becker (1996) and others that in competitive labour markets discrimination by employers, workers, or customers results in segregation of workers into different jobs by ethnicity but does not result in wage differentials for workers in identical jobs. With competitive product and labour markets, this segregation results in a "separate but equal" type of world where ethnic discrimination results in dividing the economy into sub-economies composed of single ethnic groups with identical wage and earnings outcomes across sub-economies.
But, if either of these competitive labour market assumptions is relaxed, the "separate but equal" conclusions do not follow. For example, if product markets are not competitive, so that some firms make excess profits that are partially shared with (possibly unionized) workers, then workers in those firms make more money than seemingly identical workers in other firms with less excess profits. Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) find evidence that immigrants end up in low-wage firms. Here, segregation results in unequal outcomes.
Alternatively, if labour markets are not competitive, a similar "separate but unequal" conclusion can follow. For example, consider the occupation of investment banker, a well remunerated job in large part because investment bankers must have something to lose if their investors are to trust them. If white workers have a better chance of getting these jobs than non-white workers, then occupation segregation results in earnings differentials between white and non-white workers.
3 Our econometric methodology is most suited to this latter interpretation of how labour market works. We control for the characteristics of workers in assessing earnings disparity. However, we do not control for the characteristics of their jobs because we believe that these characteristics are themselves subject to disparate access on the part of some workers relative to others.
Measured disparity responds to measurement decisions like the exclusion of work characteristics from the model. For example, Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) find that earnings gaps for visible minority immigrants are only about half as large when work characteristics like occupation, industry and number of weeks worked are included as regressors in the model. However, since we are concerned mainly with the over-time pattern of disparity, the level of measured earnings gaps is not as important as how they evolve over the years. A concern would then be that the deterioration that we observe in a model, which does not control for work characteristics might not be evident in a model which does control for them. Unfortunately, because the Census classification of occupation and industry changed dramatically between 1991/1996 and 2001/2006, one cannot create a consistent coding structure that covers all workers over all years. Consequently we do not assess this aspect of measured immigrant disparity.
Details on the full list of variables included in the regression can be found in the appendix.
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It should also be noted that changes in industry and occupation coding make comparison of work-related characteristics impossible over the four census periods.
The results of our analysis are drawn from 64 regressions (4 time periods * 4 regions * 2 ethnic categorizations * 2 genders), which assess the impacts of immigrant/ethnic earnings differentials after controlling for age, marital status, official language knowledge, household size, Census Metropolitan Area of residence and level of schooling. We run separate regressions for males and females because the census does not have a good indicator of labour force participation. So, our results allow us to compare within ---but not across---genders. 4 We note that in cases where the coefficient has a value of 0.20 or less, differences in the log of wages can be interpreted as percent differences in earnings. Thus, for example, a coefficient of 0.05 for an ethnic group would suggest that, on average, after controlling for other variables, that ethnic group could expect to earn about 5% more than the comparison ethnic group. However, for coefficients that are greater than either -0.25 or +0.25, this interpretation is not correct. For this reason, in the graphs we have converted all the coefficient values into percent differences from the comparison group. Table 1 shows coefficients from estimated log-earnings regressions that control for personal characteristics and visible minority status as described above. We present results for Canada as a whole, with CMA dummies controlling for area of residence, and for Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver separately.
Results

Canada as a Whole
5
For Canadian-born persons, the coefficient on visible minority status gives the estimated difference in log-earnings for a visible minority in comparison with a white person. As stated above, for small values (less than .25), these may be interpreted as percentage differences in earnings.The coefficient on visible minority for males in the 1991 Census data is -0.10, so we conclude that Canadian-born visible minority men earned about 10% less than their white Canadian-born counterparts.
For immigrants, the coefficient on the immigrant dummy gives the estimated difference in logearnings between a white immigrant who has been in Canada for 5 years and their white Canadian-born counterparts. For example, the coefficient on immigrant for men in the 1991 Census data is -0.27, indicating that white immigrants who arrived in Canada in 1985 (5 years before the 1990 earnings year) earned about 24% less than their white Canadian-born counterparts. 6 The estimated difference in log earnings for a visible minority immigrant is the 4
The census does not include a variable that describes the amount of time workers have been active in the labour force. Generally for men, there is an assumption that this is equal to years of age minus years of schooling. However women are more likely to be in and out of the labour force. This means that it is difficult to directly compare the earnings of men and women. For this reason we limit our analysis to comparisons within rather than across genders.
. We do not report data means because the data are drawn from the confidential files of the Censuses of Canada. However, the mean values of our data are very similar to analogous data means drawn from the public-use data files of each year's Census. 6 The coefficients on immigrant dummies give estimated disparity faced by an immigrant who has been in Canada 5 years. Immigrants with other durations in Canada are, of course, in the empirical model. To compute their sum of three effects: the immigrant effect, the visible minority effect, and the visible minority immigrant effect. For example, the coefficients on these three variables for men in the 1991 Census year are -0.27, -0.10, and -0.18, respectively, indicating that visible minority immigrants who had arrived in Canada in 1985 had earnings about 42% lower (coefficient of -0.55) than their Canadian-born white counterparts.
As noted above, for visible minority immigrants, three estimated coefficients are relevant to their earnings disparity. Thus, reading data results off of the Table can be cumbersome. In addition, for large negative values, proportionate differences in earnings are smaller in magnitude than the coefficients, and for large positive values, proportionate differences are larger in magnitude than the coefficients. In order to simplify the tracking of disparity over time, we present the information in the Table graphically, and transformed into exact proportionate differences in Table 1 graphically. It gives the proportionate differences in earnings for male and female minorities across 4 income years (1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 ). The proportionate difference in earnings for Canadian-born visible minority males was -9% in 1990 in comparison with Canadian-born white workers with otherwise similar personal characteristics. For visible minority immigrant males, the proportionate difference was 42% (which, as noted above, is smaller in magnitude than -0.55, the sum of the three relevant coefficients).
Past research suggests that labour force prospects for immigrants and visible minorities have deteriorated over time (see for example, Akbari, 1992; Howland and Sakellariou, 1993; Stelcner and Kyriazis, 1995; Christofides and Swidinsky, 1994; Baker and Benjamin, 1995; Hum and Simpson, 1999; Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; Lian and Matthews, 1998) . Our findings reiterate this. Amongst both men and women, disparity increased from 1991 to 1996 and stayed high for all immigrants and Canadian-born visible minorities. These results are easily seen in Figure 1 , which provides results for Canada-wide regressions. First, we will consider visible minority Canadian-born women. As did Pendakur and Pendakur (2011) , we see a deterioration in relative earnings over time, from a (statistically insignificant) 2% earnings advantage in 1990 to a (statistically significant) 4% earnings gap in 2005. This is not a dramatic change, but it is definitely a downward trend.
Turning to the results for white immigrant women it is apparent that immigrants saw their earnings prospects fall dramatically, from an earnings gap of 22% in 1990 to 35% in 1995 to 39% in 2005 . This is a very large change; among white immigrants with 5 years of residence in Canada, the relative earnings gap almost doubled. Now moving to visible minority immigrant women, we see an even more dramatic deterioration in relative earnings. In 1990, their earnings gap was 22%, the same as that of white immigrant women. By 1995, it had increased to 37%, and then it continued to increase unabated over the estimated earnings disparity, one would add the estimated coefficients on years in Canada and its square (plus its interactions with the visible minority indicator). We do not discuss the estimated disparities for immigrants with other durations in Canada in the text, as they make summarizing the results more confusing.
next two periods to reach 47% by 2005. For visible minority immigrant women, relative earnings disparity more than doubled from 1990 to 2005.
Canadian-born visible minority men saw their earnings gap grow from 9% in 1990 to 18% in 2005. This increase in disparity was also reported in Pendakur and Pendakur (2011) . However, that paper did not consider immigrants. White immigrant men also saw an increase in earnings disparity; their earnings gap was 24% in 1990, but it grew to 35% by 2005, with the bulk of that increase occurring between 1990 and 1995 Considering now the results for visible minority immigrant men, the earnings gap in 1990 was 42%. In 1995, it had grown to 50%, and by 2005, it had reached 54%.
All in all, we see a very strong pattern of increasing earnings disparity for all minority groups: for both males and females, Canadian-born visible minorities, immigrant whites, and immigrant visible minorities saw a big decline in their relative earnings over the 4 Census periods. For most groups, the bulk of this deterioration occurred in the early 1990s.
Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver
Given the dynamics of the Canadian labour market across regions, it is possible that the Canadawide picture might average out important variation across cities. Running regressions at the CMA level suggests that the overall patterns in the evolution of disparity identified above are evident in each of the three cities we study: Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. The over-time pattern we observe in Figure 1 is seen also for Montreal: all groups saw a decline in their relative earnings from 1990 to 2005. The deterioration is large for some groups. For female and male visible minority immigrants, the earnings gap grew by 17 and 9 percentage points, respectively. White immigrants also saw their relative earnings decline, though not by as much as visible minority immigrants did. Finally, we see a drop of about 6 percentage points in the relative earnings of Canadian-born visible minority men.
An important difference between the Canada-wide results shown in Figure 1 and the Montreal results shown in Figure 2 is that disparity tends to be worse in Montreal. For most minority groups, the earnings gap in Montreal is about 10 percentage points larger than the analogous national average earnings gap. That is, minority earnings disparity is larger in Montreal than in Canada taken as a whole, a result that echoes the findings of numerous previous papers (Pendakur and Pendakur 1998 , 2002 , 2007 , 2011 .
In Figure 3 , we present results for the Toronto CMA, the largest urban agglomeration in Canada.
Since the Toronto CMA accounts for nearly one-fifth of the data, and for nearly one-third of visible minorities, it should not be surprising that the results for Toronto closely track the national averages presented in Figure 1 . All the patterns observed for Canada as a whole are evident for the Toronto CMA; visible minorities and immigrants saw substantial declines in their relative earnings from 1990 to 2005, and much of this deterioration occurred in the early part of that period. Figure 4 presents results for the Vancouver CMA. Here, we see much the same pattern as in Figure 1 for visible minority immigrants. Earnings gaps widened from about 20% to more than 45% for women from 1990 to 2005. For men, they widened from about 45% to about 55% over the same period. The bulk of this decline occurred in the early 1990s, but decline continued throughout the rest of the period.
In contrast, for white immigrants, the decline was much smaller, and changed direction over the period. Earnings gaps for men and women were about 20% in 1990. By 2005, these had grown to about 32% and 25% for women and men, respectively. Interestingly, although both groups showed a marked deterioration in relative earnings over the early 1990s, male white immigrants showed some convergence in earnings between 1995 and 2005, with their earnings gap narrowing from 30% to 25%. 
Canada as a Whole: Disparity Across Fine-Grained Ethnic Groups
Results shown in Table 2 are drawn from regressions that break out the immigrant and visible minority categories from Table 1 . This set of analyses provides detailed earnings differentials for immigrant and Canadian-born workers across 23 European origins and 10 non-European origins for each of the 4 census periods. For each census period, we show two columns of coefficients. The first shows coefficients for the Canadian-born population, and the second shows the equivalent immigrant ethnic group. We are therefore able to compare, for example, the 1990 earnings differential for Canadian-born Greek women (-0.06) to immigrant Greek women. Greek women born in Canada get the coefficient for Greek women (-0.06 or about -6%). Greek immigrant women get both the coefficient for Greek women (-0.06) as well as the coefficient for being an immigrant (-0.23) as well as -0.03 for being a female Greek immigrant. This means the earnings differential for Greek immigrant women is large, exceeding 30 per cent (-0.06 + -0.23+-0.03= -0.32). This translates to a difference of -27%. Figures 5 through 8 show results for selected ethnic groups at the Canada-wide level. As above, these figures show differences expressed as percent differences; however, in this case, the comparison group is individuals who report only British origin on the ethnic origin question. We note that, in 2006, there is no significant difference between the earnings of people reporting British, French, or Canadian as ethnic origin, so we interpret our results as the difference in earnings between minority and majority ethnic origin workers (British, French, Canadian or any combination).
Looking first at the results for women of European origin born in Canada, we do not see any significant changes over the 15-year period (see Figure 5 ). Turning to males in Montreal, Southern and Eastern European immigrants face an additional gap of about 20% to 30% (coefficient ranging from -0.21 to -0.35) in addition to the immigrant status effect (coefficient of -0.39). Canadian-born minorities with European origins do not appear to face a great deal of disparity. However, amongst men, all visible minority groups, be they Canadian-born or immigrant, have much lower earnings. For Canadian-born, the disparity hovers around 20% -60%, whereas for immigrants, it ranges from 50% to 60%.
In Toronto in 2005, among the Canadian-born, men and women of European origin do not face a great deal of disparity. However, over all, immigrant women face an earnings gap (coefficient of -0.49). Southern and Eastern European immigrant women face an additional gap between 10% and 20%. South Asian and Chinese immigrant women also have a significant earnings gap, in addition to the general immigrant gap, of about -12%. Black groups born in Canada (African, Black, and Caribbean) all face significant disparity (coefficients ranging from -0.14 -0.32).
Turning to men, South Asian and Southeast Asian men born in Canada have seen a narrowing of disparity to about 6%. However, the immigrant groups saw an increase in disparity.
In Vancouver, we see much the same pattern for women of European origin born in Canada, where the disparity is small or insignificant for Southern European groups. For immigrant groups, however, the situation has gotten worse, with the immigrant gap increasing from -15% to about -30%. For men, those of Southern and Eastern European origin do worse, but there is not much change over time. Canadian-born Italian men, however, receive an earnings premium of about 10%.
Visible minority females born in Canada enjoy a substantial bonus in Vancouver. South Asian, Chinese and Southeast Asian women born in Canada all enjoy earnings premiums, but their foreign-born counterparts face large earnings gaps, which got worse over time (from about -20% to -40%).
Finally, turning to earnings for visible minority men born in Canada, we see that the decline in earnings is somewhat smaller. In 2005, they faced gaps of between 10% and 20%. However their foreign-born counterparts faced earnings gaps ranging from 30% to 50%. In the early part of the period, foreign-born visible minority men in Vancouver had earnings gaps of about 45% to 55%. Thus, visible minority immigrant groups, while having big earnings gaps, did not face substantial increases in the gaps. This is quite different from the situation in Montreal and Toronto.
Conclusions
The findings of this study may be summarized simply: minorities faced increasing earnings disadvantage over 1990 to 2005, with the bulk of the decline in their prospects occurring over the early 1990s. This pattern is observed broadly for both men and women, in Canada as a whole and in each of its three largest CMAs, for most Canadian-born visible minority ethnic groups, and for most white and visible minority immigrant groups. The decline in relative earnings is large: it is on the order of 10 percentage points for Canadian-born visible minorities, and on the order of 20 percentage points for both white and visible minority immigrants.
The fact that immigrants face earnings disparity is widely known (see for example, Stelcner, 2000; Lian and Mathews, 1998; Hum and Simpson 2004) . However the magnitude of the decline in prospects is not as well studied. Our results suggest that the relative labour market outcomes of recent immigrants are substantially worse today as compared to 2 decades ago.
In the same way, the fact that some minorities born in Canada face gaps in their labour market attainment is fairly well documented (although somewhat more contentious). Christophides and Swidinky (1994) and Hum and Simpson (1999) argue that minorities born in Canada do not face earnings gaps at all. However, their datasets are relatively small implying relatively imprecise estimated coefficients. Our findings, using large and consistent datasets, suggest that not only are these earnings gaps concentrated in non-European (visible minority) ethnic groups, but also they are remarkably consistent over time and in some cases getting larger. These results are consistent with those of Skuterud (2010) and Palameta (2007) .
That immigrant earnings disparity has increased over time is troubling in the context of Canada's steadily large intake of immigrants and steady increase in ethnic diversity. Canada's cities are crucibles of superdiversity, and are seen worldwide as roadmaps to a future of cohesive diversity. Growing immigrant and visible minority labour market disparity threatens this. The social and economic capital of immigrants may be the culprit here. But the welcoming---or excluding---nature of Canada's urban communities may also be at play. Unraveling these sources of disparity is an important goal of future research.
Increasing disparity faced by minorities born in Canada is troubling because these individuals are educated and socialized in Canada. In comparison with immigrants, these individuals do not face the same barriers related to language knowledge, recognition of credentials, accent penalties or lack of networks.
Understanding the evolving barriers facing immigrants and ethnic minorities in Canada will require new empirical strategies. The mechanisms outlined above are not amenable to study using traditional data sources like the Censuses of Canada. Field experimental work, such as Oreopoulous (2011), has illuminated name discrimination as an important player in immigrant and visible minority disparity. New lab experimental research may also shed light on processes of exclusion in our superdiverse urban environments. Data sources targeting particular mechanisms may also have an important role to play in uncovering the magnitudes of particular channels of immigrant disparity, as in the work of Ferrer et al (2006) on literacy skills. Finally, panel data sources must be brought to bear on these questions to reasonably assess a dynamic phenomenon like the integration of immigrants into economic life. Thus, the coefficient on the immigrant dummy may be interpreted as the log-earnings disparity faced by an immigrant who has been in Canada for 5 years. 8 We note that citizenship status is highly correlated with years since migration for permanent residents, since a very large proportion of permanent residents take up citizenship soon after they are eligible. Consequently, to avoid collinearity problems, we do not include citizenship status as a regressor. 0.01 --0.14 *** 0.03 *** --0.09 *** 0.00 --0.05 *** 0.00 --0.05 *** Vismin w white --0.08 *** --0.28 *** --0.09 *** --0.23 *** --0.14 *** --0.18 *** --0.11 *** --0.20 *** White multiple 0.03 *** --0.16 *** 0.06 *** --0.20 *** 0.03 *** --0.17 *** 0.04 *** --0.14 *** other controls include: CMA, age, level of schooling, marital status, official language knowledge and household size
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